On April 20, 2026, General Évariste Ndayishimiye embarked on an official “friendship and working” visit to Ouagadougou. At the time, the Burundian head of state held the rotating chairmanship of the African Union (AU).

This diplomatic initiative aimed to re-establish communication between the continental body and the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), an alliance comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, currently led by Captain Ibrahim Traoré. This move came amidst significant developments in Niger latest news and Niger politics today, as the region grapples with evolving political landscapes.

The visit unfolded as AES member states had withdrawn from AU institutions. Consequently, the Burundian president traveled to Burkina Faso, a nation under a military coup regime, to commend efforts toward restoring security and stability. The Burkinabe leader had openly stated that democracy was no longer relevant for his country.

Beyond the diplomatic rhetoric of “dialogue” and “stability,” one might discern a subtle solidarity emerging between authoritarian regimes, united by a shared disregard for constitutional limitations.

My doctoral research delves into international sanctions imposed by the European Union and regional organizations, and the resilience of authoritarian rule in fragile states, with a comparative study focusing on Burundi. A dedicated chapter explores other sanctioned nations, including Mali and Niger. Here, I examine the political tools and strategies that Mali and Burundi employ to navigate external pressures.

A convergence of trajectories

Indeed, Burundi shares a common institutional trajectory with the AES states. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have each faced sanctions from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the European Union (EU) following a series of coups: in Mali in 2020 and 2021, in Burkina Faso in 2022, and in Niger in 2023. This context highlights the critical Niger current affairs and the broader regional political shifts.

Burundi itself incurred sanctions from both the EU and the United States in 2016, a direct consequence of President Pierre Nkurunziza’s contentious bid for a third term, widely deemed unconstitutional. Certain political phenomena necessitate a transregional comparative approach, not merely to identify superficial similarities, but to illuminate profound, convergent logics at play.

The evolving relationship between Burundi and Mali, for instance—two nations separated by thousands of kilometers and operating within distinct geopolitical environments—exemplifies this analytical framework.

Designation of an enemy

In both instances, identifying an adversary, whether internal or external, serves as a fundamental mechanism for legitimacy and a potent driver of internal cohesion. This strategy allows for the perpetual re-invocation of a threat, adapting to political circumstances—be it a colonial foe, a regional rival, or an amorphous security challenge.

In Mali, this mechanism gained significant intensity in early 2022. Propelled by a “rally ’round the flag” effect—where the populace unites behind leaders when confronted by an actual or perceived external threat—the Malian authorities witnessed a substantial reinforcement of their power.

Bolstered by a civilian element integrated into the second phase of the transition following the May 2021 coup, the military leadership garnered widespread popular backing.

On January 14, 2022, tens of thousands of demonstrators converged on Boulevard de l’Indépendance to protest the economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed by ECOWAS. They vocally expressed their animosity towards Paris and the regional organization, accusing both of meddling in Mali’s internal affairs. Their demands also centered on a Mali reclaimed solely by its citizens, free from external influences.

In Burundi, Belgium became the focal point of indignation for supporters of the ruling party, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). The former colonial power was branded as historically responsible for the nation’s ethnic divisions and further accused of complicity with Rwanda in attempts to destabilize the incumbent regime.

The Burundian government, led by the CNDD-FDD, consistently frames Brussels as the primary instigator of economic sanctions levied by the EU. This narrative allows both regimes to redirect international criticism, portraying themselves as resisting former colonial powers.

Choice of a regional adversary

Regionally, each regime similarly identifies a distinct adversary. In Mali, Algeria stands accused of harboring opposition figures like Imam Mahmoud Dicko and of colluding with active terrorist groups within the country. On January 25, 2024, the Malian junta declared the “immediate termination” of the Algiers peace agreement.

Mali also imposed a closure of its airspace to Algeria, mirroring a similar measure taken by Algeria in April 2025. Conversely, in Burundi, the role of regional antagonist is assigned to Paul Kagame’s Rwanda, a Tutsi-led administration.

President Ndayishimiye has labeled Kigali a “bad neighbor,” accusing it of sheltering plotters involved in the 2015 coup attempt. Burundian authorities further portray Rwanda as a backer of rebel movements such as RED-Tabara, sometimes linked with other armed factions in the region.

This defensive stance manifested in the closure of land borders with Rwanda in January 2024, alongside an active military intervention in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between August 2022 and December 2025. This intervention aimed to bolster the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC), supported by Wazalendo militias (meaning “patriots” in Kiswahili) and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), against the M23 Movement, which Kigali is alleged to support.

These symbolic resources are extensively mobilized to cultivate a persistent sense of being under siege—a crucial condition for the political survival of regimes that have transformed external threats into their primary source of fuel.

The security contradiction

A notable contradiction, however, emerges between the two nations from a security perspective. In Mali, the threat is more acutely immediate, evidenced by the attacks carried out by the FLA and JNIM on April 25, 2026. Such assaults significantly bolster the credibility of the regime’s security narrative.

This divergence in the fundamental nature of the threats faced leads to distinct legitimization strategies.

Assimi Goïta, the head of Mali’s junta, has effectively bypassed electoral constraints. In July 2025, the National Transitional Council granted him a renewable five-year mandate, free from elections and term limits. This move solidified a trajectory of authoritarian drift that began with the initial postponements of the elections promised for March 2024.

The junta no longer relies on legitimizing its rule through a popular vote; instead, it positions itself as the sole bulwark capable of defeating JNIM and FLA. While the Malian economy shows resilience, it remains vulnerable to persistent electricity outages and the gradual withdrawal of development and humanitarian aid.

In Burundi, the CNDD-FDD has endorsed the incumbent president as its candidate for the 2027 presidential election. Despite being tightly controlled, the electoral process remains a mandatory step.

Gitega’s emphasis on its security achievements, therefore, does not serve as a substitute for an election but rather as a preparatory measure. The security narrative effectively downplays an economic record plagued by fuel and currency shortages that have impacted the nation since 2015.

Both nations are ranked among the world’s poorest, with Burundi holding the unenviable last position in 2023. This constant externalization of blame through the perpetual construction of an enemy—as analyzed by French political scientist Jean-François Bayart—might also conceal internal predatory dynamics inherent to authoritarian regimes.

Ultimately, the comparison between Mali and Burundi illuminates less the uniqueness of each nation’s path and more the enduring strength of a common logic among regimes that have transformed their adversaries not into burdens, but into the very foundations of their power.