It is now clearly established that the story of the so-called hidden debt, first raised during a press conference by Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko on September 26, 2024, was a major falsehood. Informed observers had warned early on, yet a whole propaganda machine worked to keep these false allegations alive in public debate.

Now that the main protagonist admits he said everything but the truth, and considering all the unfortunate consequences this declaration has had on Senegal’s credibility, its relations with partners, and the hardships Senegalese are facing, can we ask the public prosecutor to pursue Ousmane Sonko for high economic treason, dissemination of false economic news, and lying? And also to pursue all those who kept this lie alive as accomplices?

To assess this question, one must first distinguish political controversy from its potential legal implications. It is not only the content of the statement that matters, but also the status of its author, the context in which it was made, and the effects it may have had on trust in the state.

“When I spoke on certain occasions, I spoke as the leader of a political party giving his opinion.” This statement by Ousmane Sonko raises a major legal and institutional difficulty. The accusations that affected the perception of Senegal’s economy cannot be regarded as simple partisan positions since they came from an authority holding governmental functions. As Prime Minister, with the administration at his disposal under Article 57 of the Constitution, the author of such remarks necessarily engaged the authority of the state and could influence the confidence of Senegal’s external partners.

The sequence regarding the so-called “hidden” debt illustrates this ambiguity. By claiming he was speaking as a party leader and did not yet have “all the levers of the state,” Ousmane Sonko tries to place his declarations within the realm of political opposition. However, this justification must be confronted with the institutional framework in which the issue was subsequently brought before public opinion. Indeed, it was not merely a partisan speech. It was a government press conference that had on the presidium, besides Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko, the Minister Secretary-General of the Government, the Minister of Economy, and the Minister of Justice. That day, the debt issue was presented with particular gravity and repeated in institutional settings, especially during a press conference at the Prime Minister’s office and before parliament. In these circumstances, the word could no longer be equated to that of a simple political figure: it constituted the public word of a Prime Minister and thereby engaged the authority of the state.

Doctor after death

Argumentative coherence therefore requires distinguishing two levels. On one hand, political criticism remains legitimate when based on verifiable elements. On the other hand, when an accusation is presented in an institutional framework and produces effects on public or financial confidence, it must be supported by sufficiently established evidence. Otherwise, it exposes its authors to criticism of responsibility, not only political but also institutional. Hence the question of whether the prosecutor can intervene for dissemination of false economic news. This distinction naturally leads to examining the role of the Court of Auditors. If the controversy was fueled by political interpretations, we must return to the findings made by the institution responsible for controlling public accounts to measure the gap between the report itself and the qualifications drawn from it.

In this context, an interview given by Mamadou Faye, predecessor of Abdoul Magib Guèye as head of the Court of Auditors, reignites the controversy. By asserting that nowhere in the Court of Auditors’ report is the word “hidden debt” mentioned, the former magistrate acted like a doctor after death. When asked about the existence of a “hidden debt,” the magistrate refers to the report itself and stresses that no page explicitly mentions this qualification. This precision is decisive: it distinguishes the Court’s technical findings from the political interpretations that may have been drawn. For two years, he watched Ousmane Sonko, in complicity with Bassirou Diomaye Faye, drag Senegal into a sterile debate without ever reacting. Mamadou Faye would have done better to remain silent permanently. But returning to the publication of the February 2025 report, he recalls that the institution limited itself to presenting its findings according to its own control methods. He also specifies the working method followed by the Court. The debt-to-GDP ratio was calculated using the TOFE method, i.e., the Table of Financial Operations of the State, as well as the budget method based on the difference between revenue and expenditure relative to GDP. According to this explanation, both approaches should have led to consistent results if the transition table had been properly used.

Thus, the absence of explicit mention of the concept of “hidden debt” does not alone close the debate, but it weakens the political qualification made of it. It shifts the center of gravity of the discussion: it is no longer just about knowing whether accounting anomalies existed, but determining whether their public presentation was accurate, proportionate, and legally responsible.

The controversy around this lie is therefore not neutral. By dragging on without sufficiently firm clarification, it contributed to weakening Senegal’s financial credibility, fueling uncertainty among economic actors, and weighing on the perception of rating agencies. The responsibility of public actors must then be assessed in light of the foreseeable effects of their statements, especially when those statements concern debt, the sincerity of public accounts, and the state’s ability to honor its commitments.

Financial credibility of the state

This analysis echoes warnings already made. We stressed that reckless government communication about debt could weaken market confidence, provoke a negative reaction from investors, lead to a downgrade of the sovereign rating, and increase the cost of borrowing. These effects, if materialized, can then reduce budgetary margins, slow investment, and weigh on employment.

After the publication of the Court of Auditors’ report, the challenge was not to transform administrative dysfunctions into a political scandal, but to precisely determine their nature, scope, and legal consequences. The report first called for an administrative, budgetary, and institutional response: correction of procedures, improvement of accounting traceability, and clarification of possible responsibilities.

This requirement of rigor concerns not only public debt. It applies more broadly to any spectacular economic statement likely to engage the credibility of the state or create expectations in public opinion without sufficient evidentiary basis.

The same requirement applies to claims about the alleged existence of 1000 billion CFA francs in an account attributed to a former dignitary of the outgoing regime. A statement of this nature, when it comes from a public official, cannot rest on a simple assertion. It must be supported by verifiable elements that can be examined by competent courts or authorized oversight bodies. Otherwise, it fuels confusion, weakens institutional trust, and exposes its author to contestation on responsibility grounds. Asking the prosecutor to self-refer is not just a partisan controversy. It refers to a broader principle: public speech, especially when it comes from a government authority, must be proportionate, verifiable, and compatible with the requirements of institutional stability. When economic statements are likely to affect the financial credibility of the state, it is up to the competent institutions to assess whether they fall within ordinary political debate or justify further examination under applicable law.

Beyond this controversy, the question also refers to the lasting role of oversight institutions. The credibility of public speech depends on the ability of competent bodies to produce regular, readable, and indisputable findings to inform democratic debate.

Postscript:

The new head of the Court of Auditors ticks all the boxes, making his appointment a consecration of his long and rich career within this institution. However, he is a transitional president (he has less than three years until retirement), but above all a mission president. He must thus meet four challenges. The first is regularity in the publication of annual reports. The second is the completion of the reform of the Court of Auditors to align it with international standards. The third is to open the institution to technical professions (petroleum engineers, gas, infrastructure, certified accountants, public health specialists), rely on internal skills through a career plan for auditors within the institution, help highlight the Court’s important achievements, and especially open up to citizens for better ownership of the Court’s missions and activities. Finally, the fourth concerns the strengthening of the professionalization of the Court’s trades (certification of accounts and evaluation of public policies).