Dialogue vs. alliance: Is engaging with armed groups in northern Mali a viable path to peace? Can Bamako break free from isolation without compromising national unity? In a candid interview, Étienne Fabaka Sissoko, spokesperson for the Coalition of Forces for the Republic (CFR), shares his movement’s roadmap for resolving the crisis, outlines its non-negotiable principles, and clarifies why, in his view, ‘dialogue is not the same as alliance.’
With Mali’s security landscape rapidly deteriorating, particularly in Bamako where supply chains are strained and daily life is increasingly uncertain, the CFR asserts that military solutions alone cannot bring lasting stability. Instead, they advocate for a political approach centered on dialogue, inclusive governance, and the restoration of state authority at the local level.
Security crisis in Bamako and beyond
Q: How do you assess the current security situation in Mali, especially in Bamako? Is the blockade effective?
Étienne Fabaka Sissoko: Describing the blockade as ‘effective’ would imply that starving civilians and suffocating trade routes could ever be justified as a solution. That is not acceptable. The blockade has devastated lives in Bamako, driving up prices, disrupting essential supplies, and instilling fear in families. For a landlocked nation like Mali, controlling access to vital corridors is a matter of sovereignty. The CFR opposes this strategy because it punishes the people first and foremost.
This crisis underscores a hard truth: military force alone cannot resolve Mali’s deep-seated issues. What’s needed is a political response that protects civilians, secures supply routes, and lays the groundwork for sustainable peace.
The CFR: A young movement with a clear mandate
Q: Since its formation in December 2025, how has the CFR been received by the Malian public? Do you sense real demand for your platform?
É.F.S.: The CFR remains a young movement, but it is already filling a critical gap. Malians are desperate for peace and a credible alternative to the current impasse. We are not a traditional political party; we are a national safeguard platform. There is growing demand—both domestically and internationally—for a structured, responsible Malian voice. Our goal is to offer a middle path between prolonged military rule and national collapse. We aim to restore civic freedoms, rebuild trust in institutions, and steer the country toward a peaceful transition.
Q: There are persistent claims of close ties between the CFR and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). Can you clarify the nature of your relationship?
É.F.S.: The CFR is not the political wing of the FLA, nor is the FLA our armed extension. We engage with all stakeholders, but dialogue does not mean alliance or coordination of military operations. The CFR is a civilian movement that takes no part in armed activities. Our stance is unambiguous: we reject any division of Mali. However, we believe territorial and governance questions must be addressed through political dialogue, not conflict. The CFR champions transparent, republican dialogue as the only path forward.
No automatic legitimacy for armed groups
Q: Four months after the CFR’s creation, the JNIM launched a major offensive across several regions. If that offensive had toppled the regime, was the CFR prepared to assume political leadership? Had you planned for a transition scenario?
É.F.S.: A responsible movement must always prepare for crisis scenarios. Yet the CFR does not build its strategy on state collapse or the military victory of any armed faction. The coordinated attacks of April 25, 2026, thrust Mali into a dangerous political limbo. But this does not automatically grant armed groups the right to dictate the nation’s future. We have, however, developed a blueprint for a civilian-led transition aimed at restoring public freedoms, protecting communities, initiating national dialogue, drafting a new constitution, and organizing elections. The presidential vote must be the culmination—not the starting point—of this process. Without minimum security and national consensus, history will repeat itself.
Q: If the CFR were to take power, what role could Imam Mahmoud Dicko play?
É.F.S.: Imam Mahmoud Dicko should not be cast as a substitute political leader. He could serve as a moral authority—helping ease tensions, facilitate dialogue, and rebuild trust among Mali’s diverse communities. But executive power must reside in legitimate civilian institutions. Political legitimacy must flow from the people and the ballot box, not from unelected figures.
Dialogue without surrender or reward
Q: The CFR advocates dialogue with the JNIM. How far are you willing to go? Are there red lines? Some observers, including figures close to the CFR and French officials, suggest that Iyad Ag Ghali may be open to abandoning transnational jihad in favor of a peace process. Do you share this view?
É.F.S.: Our proposed dialogue is neither surrender nor reward. It is a tool to end the war and protect civilians. The main challenge is the JNIM’s affiliation with Al-Qaeda, which is incompatible with a national peace process. Our red lines are clear: preserving Mali’s unity, upholding republican values, protecting fundamental freedoms, cutting ties with transnational armed agendas, ending attacks on civilians, and ensuring accountability for grave crimes. As for Iyad Ag Ghali, we do not base our national strategy on assumptions about an individual’s intentions. What matters are verifiable actions. If JNIM-affiliated actors wish to join a strictly Malian peace process, they must prove it through deeds: halting attacks, protecting civilians, allowing humanitarian access, severing ties with Al-Qaeda, and accepting Mali’s unity. Recent attacks in neighboring countries show that the threat transcends Mali’s borders. That is precisely why any break with transnational agendas must be demonstrated, not merely declared. We are not negotiating the Malian state; we are discussing the conditions to end the war without surrendering the Republic.
No to Sharia: The CFR’s vision for governance
Q: You often call for deeper decentralization or even federalism. Yet public debate often fixates on the imposition of Sharia in certain regions. Isn’t that a narrow focus?
É.F.S.: Absolutely. The real issue is not Sharia, but the collapse of grassroots governance. In many areas, the state is absent, justice is unreachable, and public services are failing. Communities turn to customary leaders, local notables, religious figures, or mediators who remain present. The CFR does not promote Sharia. We promote a Malian Republic capable of integrating local mediation within a strictly constitutional framework. Our principles are clear: respect for the Constitution, equality before the law, protection of women and children, and the right to appeal to national courts. The debate on decentralization must focus on governance and state effectiveness—not on caricatures.
Q: Doesn’t federalism primarily concern the distribution of power, resources, and revenue between Bamako and local authorities?
É.F.S.: Precisely. The core issue is competence, resources, and democratic oversight. The CFR supports a united, sovereign, and indivisible Mali—but one that is more regionally empowered. Local governments must have greater responsibilities and resources, while the state retains its sovereign functions. In a country as vast as Mali, centralizing everything in Bamako is inefficient. The state must guarantee national unity, while territories manage their own affairs with the means to do so.
Rebuilding a functional state
Q: Beyond criticizing current leadership, does the CFR have a structured political program? What are your concrete proposals for education, justice, security, and economic development?
É.F.S.: Yes. The CFR has a transition program focused on rebuilding a functional state. Our priorities include reopening schools, strengthening the judiciary, protecting communities, and reviving the economy. We advocate for an independent judiciary, support for teachers, enhanced security capabilities, and securing major economic corridors. The crisis is also humanitarian. Restoring access to education, justice, security, energy, and food is, in our view, the first step toward national reconstruction.
Q: The Alliance of Democrats of the Sahel (ADS) emerged shortly after the CFR. Is this a convergence of like-minded movements or a coordinated regional political project?
É.F.S.: The ADS is a civic and democratic convergence among Malian, Burkinabè, and Nigerien citizens who share a common assessment: the Sahel crisis is institutional and democratic at its core. It is not a military structure or a unified political command. The CFR remains a Malian initiative addressing Mali’s specific crisis. The ADS’s purpose is to coordinate advocacy, defend public freedoms, and foster solidarity among Sahelian democrats facing shrinking political space. The CFR does not advocate revenge, partition, theocracy, or a mechanical return to the old system. We champion a peaceful exit from war through a civilian transition, inclusive national dialogue, territorial refounding, a republican army, and the restoration of popular choice. Our conviction is simple: Mali will not be saved by a strongman. It will be saved by a strong national pact.