Following the coordinated assaults on April 25 and 26 that struck Bamako, Kati, Gao, Sévaré, and Kidal, a previously unspoken question is now at the forefront of Mali’s security discussions: should negotiations begin with jihadist groups? The sheer scale of the offensive, jointly executed by the Jnim (Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin), an Al-Qaïda affiliate, and the Tuareg rebels of the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA), has led numerous analysts and observers to conclude that a purely military approach has reached its limits.

The militant campaign rapidly expanded across Mali, from its northern reaches to the south. Armed factions launched a barrage of synchronized attacks targeting military forces and symbols of state authority in at least six cities, even reaching the outskirts of Bamako. Notably, this marked the first time the Jnim and the FLA visibly operated in concert. The FLA, established in November 2024 after the dissolution of the Cadre stratégique permanent (CSP), advocates for the self-determination of Azawad, a vast northern Malian territory.

These recent attacks starkly revealed the Malian regime’s fragility. Neither the junta led by Assimi Goïta nor its Russian partners from Africa Corps appear capable of halting the advance of these armed groups. Across regional media and diplomatic circles, the prospect of negotiations with the Jnim is now being openly discussed, set against a backdrop of Bamako’s gradual weakening and a deepening regional quagmire. Despite this, the junta publicly dismisses any notion of dialogue, affirming its exclusion of “any talks with armed terrorist groups” and maintaining a strict military posture, even as the security situation rapidly deteriorates.

Since late April, pressure on the regime has intensified relentlessly. Violence has escalated dramatically in the country’s central regions. For instance, on a recent Friday, several villages in the Bankass area, including Kouroude and Dougara, came under attack. Local and security sources indicate that the combined death toll from attacks on Wednesday and Friday ranged between 70 and 80.

An unprecedented alliance, a stark warning

The Jnim remains the primary driver of jihadist activity across the Sahel, particularly in Mali, but also extending its influence into Burkina Faso and Niger. For the military juntas aligned under the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), the situation is becoming increasingly dire. These regimes, which seized power promising to restore security, are struggling to contain a threat that continues to expand. In Mali, attacks have been drawing inexorably closer to the capital for almost a year.

“Beginning in July 2025, jihadists initiated attacks in western Mali, targeting gold mining and industrial sites. They then focused on the Bamako-Dakar corridor, effectively suffocating the capital,” explains Alain Antil, director of the Ifri’s Sub-Saharan Africa Centre. “This time, what is striking is not merely the scale of the operation, but also the deliberate choice of targets. Kati and Bamako represent the very heart of the regime,” analyzes Héni Nsaibia of Acled.

The death of Defense Minister Sadio Camara in Kati profoundly destabilized the government. Simultaneously, the loss of Kidal – a city retaken in late 2023 and heralded as a significant victory – represents a major strategic setback.

The strategy of strangulation

Even before this latest offensive, several experts had noted an evolution in Jnim’s strategy. “There is a deliberate effort to establish a more powerful balance of force, not only through security pressure but also to compel Malian authorities to negotiate,” Alain Antil had previously explained.

The jihadist group now aims to replicate its successful local tactics on a national scale: implementing economic blockades, progressively encircling urban centers, and exerting pressure on vital logistical routes. “The Jnim is attempting to maintain an economic blockade around Bamako,” the researcher emphasizes.

For Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, this tactical approach is a long-term endeavor: “They have chosen to weaken the government from within, prioritizing a strategy of attrition and exploiting existing fractures within the military system.” He further notes, “The Jnim no longer insists on the application of Sharia as a prerequisite for peace and now declares itself open to negotiation.”

Adding to this complex landscape, the ongoing rivalry with the État islamique au Grand Sahara (EIGS) introduces another layer of instability, as each group strives to expand its territorial control and influence.

A taboo option becoming inevitable

Officially, Sahelian regimes unequivocally reject any form of dialogue. “For the leaders of the AES, political negotiation is not even considered. The rhetoric remains martial, with military response as the sole option,” observes Alain Antil.

However, on the ground, the reality is far more nuanced. Atrocities perpetrated by state forces and their allies have severely eroded public trust. Between January 2024 and March 2025, nearly 1,500 civilians were killed by government forces and their Russian partners in Mali – almost five times the number attributed to the Jnim, according to the GI-TOC. This cycle of violence fuels resentment and inadvertently facilitates jihadist recruitment.

States must commit to a brave compromise.

Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa, chercheur spécialiste du Sahel

Faced with this stalemate, an increasing number of experts advocate for a fundamental shift in strategy. “A purely military option is a dead end against the jihadist phenomenon in the Sahel. It must be combined with political negotiations,” asserts Alain Antil of the Ifri. Certain grievances articulated by jihadist groups – such as corruption, demands for justice, and access to resources – could potentially serve as a foundation for discussions, without condoning their violence.

Abdel Nasser Ould Ethmane Elyessa takes this further: “States must commit to a brave compromise. The idea would be to integrate jihadists into the political framework to expose their limitations.” Yet, he outlines clear red lines: “The principle of gender equality and the secular nature of the state are non-negotiable.”

As jihadist offensives continue to advance, the notion of negotiation is steadily transforming from a controversial idea into a pragmatic political consideration. For many experts in Mali, the pertinent question is no longer whether to engage in dialogue, but rather how much longer Bamako can afford to resist it.