RGPH 2024 and Morocco’s 2026 electoral map: when demographics clash with fair representation

The 2024 census exposes Morocco’s shifting population landscape, where booming suburbs and shrinking city centers challenge the fairness of the upcoming 2026 legislative elections. A closer look at the electoral map reveals glaring disparities in voter-to-representative ratios across the country.

The 2024 General Population and Housing Census (RGPH) has uncovered sweeping demographic changes across Morocco. Over the past decade, rapid urban expansion, particularly in suburban zones, has reshaped the country’s population distribution. While historic city centers are losing residents, sparsely populated rural areas and high-density urban peripheries are growing at unprecedented rates. These shifts raise critical questions about the fairness of Morocco’s electoral map ahead of the September 2026 legislative elections.

Voter-to-representative ratios expose stark inequities

The Moroccan electoral system operates under two key principles: demographic proportionality and minimum territorial representation. The latter ensures that even the least populated provinces receive at least two parliamentary seats. However, this safeguard creates significant disparities in voter representation across the country.

In sparsely populated southern provinces, the ratio of eligible voters per deputy is remarkably low:

• Aousserd: 2,992 eligible voters per seat
• Tarfaya: 5,368 eligible voters per seat
• Assa-Zag: 10,178 eligible voters per seat
• Es-Semara: 19,712 eligible voters per seat
• Boujdour: 20,185 eligible voters per seat

By contrast, overcrowded urban districts face the opposite problem:

• Tanger-Assilah: 213,980 eligible voters per seat
• Ménara (Marrakech): 176,256 eligible voters per seat
• Sidi Bernoussi (Casablanca): 174,501 eligible voters per seat
• Nouaceur (Casablanca periphery): 155,172 eligible voters per seat
• Inezgane-Aït Melloul: 151,978 eligible voters per seat

The implications are clear: a single vote in Aousserd carries far greater influence in electing a deputy than a vote cast in Tanger or Marrakech.

Urbanization deepens the urban-rural divide

RGPH 2024 data confirms Morocco’s accelerating urbanization. Out of a total population of 36.8 million, urban dwellers now number 23.1 million—an increase of nearly 2.7 million over the past decade. Meanwhile, rural populations have grown by just 302,419, totaling 13.7 million. Over 71% of Moroccans now live in five regions: Greater Casablanca-Settat, Rabat-Salé-Kénitra, Marrakech-Safi, Fès-Meknès, and Tanger-Tétouan-Al Hoceïma.

The census also highlights a striking trend: the migration of residents from historic city centers to peripheral municipalities. Casablanca’s Anfa district, for example, lost nearly a quarter of its population in ten years, dropping from 453,000 to 332,000. Yet, it retains its four parliamentary seats, resulting in a ratio of 68,707 eligible voters per deputy—a figure far below the national average. Meanwhile, Nouaceur, a fast-growing periphery of Casablanca, has doubled its population to 665,000 and holds just three seats, yielding a ratio of 155,172 eligible voters per deputy.

Similar imbalances appear in the Rabat metropolitan area, where central districts like Rabat-Océan and Rabat-Chellah have ratios of 55,856 and 59,598 eligible voters per seat, respectively, while the expanding Skhirat-Témara region shows 141,832 eligible voters per seat.

Political stakes of electoral redistricting

Redrawing the electoral map to reflect 2024 census data presents complex political challenges ahead of the 2026 elections. If the Interior Ministry opts to rebalance seats without increasing the total number of deputies, it would need to reduce seats in declining urban centers (such as Anfa or Rabat districts) and redistribute them to fast-growing peripheries like Nouaceur or Skhirat-Témara.

This adjustment would intensify electoral competition in shrinking districts, favoring established parties with robust financial and organizational resources—such as the RNI, PAM, and Istiqlal—while potentially marginalizing smaller formations. Conversely, larger districts with more seats could lower the threshold for parliamentary entry via the “largest remainder” system, benefiting smaller parties.

Rural voting habits and urban abstention

Despite rising urbanization, many city residents remain registered and vote in their rural hometowns to preserve local influence. This practice explains the traditionally high turnout rates in rural areas, often exceeding 90% of registered voters. In contrast, urban constituencies—especially middle-class districts—experience extreme abstention, with rates surpassing 70% to 80%.

The 2026 election cycle marks a critical juncture in this evolving landscape. Ongoing voter registration and list revision campaigns aim to update records for citizens who have relocated, correct inaccuracies, and enhance the reliability of the electoral roll ahead of the September 23 vote.

2026 elections: a test for urban middle-class mobilization

The demographic shifts revealed by RGPH 2024 carry strategic implications for the next elections. The urban middle class, hit hard by inflation and disillusioned by targeted social reforms, largely abstained in 2021. Their potential return to the polls in 2026—whether as a protest vote or in support of new alternatives—could reshape the political balance.

Major parties, including those in the ruling coalition, must defend their economic and social records in a post-inflation environment. Meanwhile, opposition groups like the PJD seek to harness urban discontent and rekindle support among disillusioned local activists.

Balancing the demographic realities of RGPH 2024 with the need to preserve territorial equity will demand precision from policymakers. Though no official electoral map revision has been announced, the census data has already sparked an essential debate on representation in the lead-up to the 2026 legislative elections.