While Lomé frequently presents itself as a regional mediator, a considerably more concerning narrative is emerging from Western diplomatic circles. According to diplomatic sources and American intelligence reports, the administration led by Faure Gnassingbé is accused of orchestrating covert discussions between Captain Ibrahim Traoré and jihadist factions of the JNIM. The purported aim of these negotiations was to secure a fragile calm in Burkina Faso, achieved at the significant cost of a severe betrayal against Mali, under the leadership of Assimi Goïta. By allegedly facilitating an understanding between these terrorist groups and the FLA rebels to undermine Bamako, the Togolese autocrat appears to be dangerously engaging with the volatile dynamics of the Sahel, potentially fracturing the unity of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) to safeguard his own diplomatic survival.

For many decades, the Gnassingbé family’s hold on power in Togo has persisted by making the nation seem indispensable. Faure, inheriting a half-century-old autocratic system, reportedly recognized that to divert attention from internal grievances, he needed to cultivate an image as the indispensable ‘facilitator’ in the Sahel. Yet, behind the public displays of cordiality at Lomé summits, intelligence agencies, notably the CIA and French military intelligence, have been meticulously documenting a far more insidious and clandestine diplomatic ballet for several months.

The conclusions drawn by these intelligence bodies are unequivocal: Togo is reportedly not merely engaging with coup leaders; it is serving as an intermediary between sovereign nations and terrorist organizations designated on international blacklists.

The alleged agreement: JNIM spares Ouagadougou to target Bamako

The investigation indicates that, under the alleged guidance of Faure Gnassingbé, representatives from Ouagadougou and key figures from the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) convened on multiple occasions. The alleged arrangement is starkly cynical in its simplicity: the JNIM would reduce its operational pressure on Burkinabè territory, thereby enabling Captain Ibrahim Traoré to solidify his domestic authority. In exchange, the JNIM would gain enhanced operational freedom to focus on a primary objective: Mali.

This purported agreement extends beyond a mere non-aggression pact. American intelligence sources highlight a more intricate and Machiavellian strategy. Lomé is believed to have either encouraged, or at least facilitated, a convergence of interests between the JNIM and the Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) rebels. The goal of this unnatural alliance? To dislodge Colonel Assimi Goïta in Bamako, who is reportedly perceived as too unyielding or too aligned with external influences that complicate Lomé’s strategic calculations.

The AES betrayal: the turning point of april 25

The true nature of these alleged dealings reportedly became undeniably clear during the extensive attacks on April 25. As Malian forces found themselves under fierce assault from a hybrid JNIM-FLA coalition, an unprecedented development seemingly corroborated the existence of these secret accords.

In a statement disseminated through their usual propaganda channels, the attackers explicitly instructed Burkina Faso and Niger to refrain from intervention. The message was unambiguous: «This is a matter strictly between us and Bamako.» Even more perplexing was the pronounced silence and inaction of Burkinabè and Nigerien troops on that critical day, which astonished military observers.

In accordance with the agreements allegedly brokered in Lomé, Ibrahim Traoré reportedly left his Malian ‘ally’ to confront the peril alone. This perceived passivity was not a tactical oversight; it was, according to reports, the strict implementation of a non-interference protocol signed under the purported direction of Faure Gnassingbé. The Alliance of Sahel States, ostensibly a bulwark of unwavering solidarity against terrorism, seemingly crumbled on the altar of this alleged Togolese betrayal.

Why faure gnassingbé allegedly plays this game

This strategy is primarily driven by a desire for survival through engineered instability. By allegedly destabilizing neighboring states, Faure Gnassingbé ensures that no alternative transition model achieves significant success, while simultaneously positioning himself as the sole interlocutor capable of ‘calming the situation’ for international partners.

Security blackmail also serves as a potent instrument. By maintaining direct communication channels with the JNIM, Togo ostensibly safeguards its own northern borders, sacrificing Mali to prevent the spread of attacks towards Lomé.

Ultimately, the weakening of Assimi Goïta remains a key priority. The Malian leader, through his perceived inflexibility, is said to overshadow Togolese diplomatic influence. His potential downfall or diminished power would allegedly restore Faure Gnassingbé’s role as a pivotal regional figure, to the detriment of broader African solidarity.

A ‘firefighter-arsonist’ diplomacy with disastrous consequences

These maneuvers, which could be dismissed as foolish if not for their criminal implications, attributed to Faure Gnassingbé, are believed to have irreversible consequences. The relationship between Captain Ibrahim Traoré and Colonel Assimi Goïta is now reportedly tainted by profound mistrust. How can confidence be sustained when one is accused of negotiating with the assailant of the other?

By allegedly acting in this manner, the Togolese regime has not only weakened Mali; it has, according to reports, handed the JNIM a significant strategic triumph: the fragmentation of Sahelian armies. The terrorist group no longer needs to confront all adversaries simultaneously; it can simply forge local agreements, purportedly endorsed by a compliant coastal state, to isolate its targets one by one.

The cost of autocracy

Togo, under the firm grip of Faure Gnassingbé, is increasingly becoming isolated behind a facade of diplomatic maneuvering. By purportedly attempting to manipulate terrorist groups and ambitious young captains, the autocrat in Lomé has, according to observers, undermined the prospects for a coordinated regional response to terrorism in the sub-region.

History may recount that it was in Lomé where the dagger was allegedly sharpened to be plunged into Mali’s back. Western intelligence agencies now reportedly view the Togolese ‘mediator’ for what he truly is: a destabilizing force who, to preserve his own power, is allegedly prepared to consign the Sahel to the flames of discord and jihadism. Should Assimi Goïta’s downfall occur, it will reportedly bear the signature of Lomé, but the ensuing chaos is unlikely to spare anyone, not even those who believed they could control it.