On 25 April, Mali experienced a wave of coordinated attacks carried out by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA). The assaults targeted Kati, Mopti, Sévaré, Gao, and the capital Bamako, resulting in numerous casualties and the assassination of Defence Minister Sadio Camara.

Malian authorities launched a counteroffensive against positions held by these groups. The military prosecutor in Bamako also announced the arrest of several suspects, including civilians, active-duty soldiers, and former military personnel.

Five days after the attacks began, JNIM imposed a blockade on the capital, specifically targeting routes west of the country. The complete closure of the road linking Kita to Bamako trapped hundreds of people and complicated food and water supplies.

This siege also disrupts commercial flows, halting all traffic on the Kayes-Bamako axis. Furthermore, the expansion of the blockade now includes attacks on transport convoys on the Conakry-Bamako route, which had previously been relatively safe.

Since September 2025, JNIM has adopted a strategy targeting fuel convoys on strategic supply routes in western and southern Mali. These attacks destabilise trade and, if they continue to spread, could affect West African economies.

West African countries are closely linked through trade. Coastal state ports currently serve as the main entry and exit points for the central Sahel countries. Road corridors connecting these ports to Sahelian capitals and beyond act as lifelines, most of which pass through JNIM operational zones.

The Dakar-Bamako corridor is a strategic route for both countries and currently appears to be the most affected by insecurity in western Mali. In 2024, Mali was Senegal’s top customer, absorbing 26.5% of Senegalese exports, worth about 802.8 billion CFA francs ($1.42 billion). In the first nine months of 2025, Senegalese exports to Mali totalled 662 billion CFA francs ($1.17 billion).

Data from Senegal’s Directorate of Forecasting and Economic Studies (2025) show that JNIM attacks in western Mali significantly impacted trade between the two countries compared to 2024 levels. Between September and November 2025, the port of Dakar recorded a daily blockage of approximately 120 containers destined for Mali, costing Senegal an estimated monthly loss of 15 billion CFA francs ($26.54 million). By late November 2025, over 2,000 containers were stranded in Dakar. In February 2026, some 4,000 empty containers were stuck in Bamako, as truck drivers feared the dangerous return journey to Dakar.

This situation severely reduces Mali’s supply of petroleum products, refined goods, hydraulic cement, and food. It also undermines the livelihoods of thousands of drivers, traders, and freight forwarders. Other corridors, particularly those linking the ports of Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and Benin to the Sahel, could face similar risks.

In 2025, Mali remained the top customer of Côte d’Ivoire within the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). The Abidjan-Bamako corridor plays a vital role in supplying Mali with petroleum and food products. By late 2025, about 1.47 million tonnes of goods had transited through this route, which is now targeted by JNIM attacks in the Sikasso region.

Côte d’Ivoire is also Burkina Faso’s leading African supplier, mainly of petroleum products, electricity, and fertilisers. Burkina Faso’s imports come from or pass through Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Senegal. On 14 February, seven Ghanaian tomato traders were killed in a JNIM attack in Titao, northern Burkina Faso, highlighting security risks on the road linking the two countries. Currently, the terrorist threat is most acute on Malian territory. Authorities have taken several measures, including military escort for fuel convoys since November, allowing 200 to 300 tanker trucks per week, down from nearly 1,200 before the attacks began.

The government signed a protocol with Malian oil groups to simplify and speed up customs procedures. A fuel rationing system was introduced to curb the black market. Authorities are also trying to reduce pressure on the ports of Dakar and Abidjan by redirecting some trade flows to other port facilities.

A truce between Bamako and jihadist groups until Eid al-Adha, reportedly involving the release of over a hundred prisoners accused of terrorism, was denied by Malian authorities after attacks continued.

The 25 April attacks illustrate the limits of the military response favoured by Malian authorities against terrorism. While JNIM and FLA set aside differences to conduct these major offensives, Sahelian and coastal states struggle to form alliances. The regional consequences of the JNIM blockade underscore the need for joint protection of cross-border trade corridors. Governments and regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Sahel Alliance (AES), the Conseil de l’Entente, the Mano River Union, and WAEMU must prevent this phenomenon from spreading to other road routes.

The fight against terrorism could drive a much-needed revival of regional cooperation between Sahelian and coastal West African states.