President Emmanuel Macron has adopted a remarkably direct tone, akin to a settling of scores, to describe the current state of relations between France and the military regimes of the Sahel. His assertion that Paris has been “repaid with ingratitude” unequivocally marks the conclusion of a diplomatic cycle that spanned over a decade. This forthright declaration is clearly aimed at the ruling juntas in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey – three capitals that have successively communicated the termination of bilateral military cooperation with France.

Presidential remarks solidify sahelian severance

The language emanating from the Élysée Palace stands in stark contrast to the usual diplomatic caution exercised when addressing African partners. By emphasizing France’s significant human and financial sacrifices, Emmanuel Macron seeks to place the responsibility for this diplomatic rupture squarely on the transitional authorities that emerged from the coups in 2020, 2022, and 2023. This discourse also targets a domestic audience, as the unfolding events in the Sahel are widely viewed in France as a major strategic setback, particularly since the forced withdrawal of Operation Barkhane in 2022.

However, the President’s pointed remarks risk further exacerbating an already fragile situation. In both Bamako and Niamey, the official narrative has been built upon the denunciation of a French presence deemed intrusive, even neocolonial. Each grievance-laden statement from the Élysée inadvertently fuels the sovereignty-focused rhetoric championed by leaders such as Colonels Assimi Goïta, Ibrahim Traoré, and Abdourahamane Tiani. European chancelleries, closely observing these developments, fear that such strong language could also complicate their own remaining channels of communication with the Sahelian capitals.

The alliance of Sahel states confronts french disengagement

Since the establishment of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in September 2023, which transitioned into a confederation in July 2024, the three military regimes have rapidly accelerated their diplomatic reorientation. This includes their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a deepening rapprochement with Moscow via Africa Corps (the successor to Wagner), and an opening towards Ankara and Tehran. The geopolitical repositioning of Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey is proceeding at an accelerated pace. France, which once maintained a notable economic footprint through entities like the CFA franc, Orange, TotalEnergies, and Eramet, is now witnessing its levers of influence recede.

Concretely, the anticipated departure of the last French troops from Chad and Senegal by the end of 2024 will finalize Paris’s military withdrawal from the Sahelo-Saharan region. The French deployment in West Africa, which numbered over 5,000 personnel in 2020, is now reduced to a residual presence, primarily focused on training and intelligence. This significant contraction fundamentally transforms France’s long-standing model of influence, which was historically underpinned by force projection.

A double-edged rhetoric for Paris

By publicly citing the ingratitude of its African partners, Emmanuel Macron risks reinforcing a postcolonial interpretation that has already resonated widely with Sahelian public opinion, particularly among urban and youth segments. Whether intended or not, the term evokes a paternalistic language that the French executive had ostensibly sought to dismantle since the Ouagadougou speech in November 2017. The stark contrast between initial promises of a renewed Franco-African relationship and the current reality of rupture is now undeniable.

Furthermore, the presidential statement comes at a time when Paris is actively seeking to reconfigure its African partnerships around more stable states, ranging from Morocco to Côte d’Ivoire, including Bénin and Mauritania. This strategy of bypassing the Sahel necessitates measured public communication, lest it jeopardize the entire spectrum of France’s regional relationships. Several African diplomats, even in allied nations, privately express discomfort with what they perceive as an overly personal register.

In Dakar, Abidjan, and Nouakchott, these developments are being closely observed, as they highlight France’s difficulty in cleanly closing one chapter without reopening old wounds. The critical question remains: how can Paris restore its credibility as an attentive partner on the continent while grappling with a Sahelian legacy it feels has been unjustly received?