Mali’s challenging path: five years post-coup d’état

Exactly five years have passed since General Assimi Goïta’s government assumed control in Mali through a coup d’état. Since that time, the Malian population has faced significant challenges, including a decline in security, restricted freedom of expression, and diminishing press freedom. These issues have drawn widespread criticism regarding the current trajectory of the nation.

To gain further insight into Mali’s current state, I spoke with Ulf Laessing, who serves as the Sahel Program Director for the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Mali.

An interview with Ulf Laessing on Mali’s challenges

Ulf Laessing highlighted the growing suppression of dissent. He noted that open discussions are now more difficult to have, even among trusted individuals, and people have become increasingly cautious about expressing their views. This represents a clear point of criticism against the government. Furthermore, numerous critical voices have been imprisoned, while others have been compelled to seek refuge abroad.

What, if anything, has improved for the Malian populace since the military took power?

Laessing explained that initially, some parts of the country experienced a slight improvement in security. For instance, the route to Ségou remained open for an extended period, allowing certain farmers to return to their lands. However, this positive trend has since reversed. The crisis has deepened, and with rapid population growth, climate change impacts, and pervasive insecurity, I am quite pessimistic about any government’s ability to significantly alter the situation.

In 2020, the military seized power with the stated aim of eliminating jihadist threats. This objective doesn’t appear to be progressing well.

Laessing confirmed that groups like JNIM and the Islamic State effectively control certain regions of Mali. He believes it’s unlikely any government, whether through another coup or a future elected administration, will be able to reclaim these areas. He remains rather pessimistic about the prospects of achieving lasting peace across the nation.

In late April, Mali endured several coordinated attacks by jihadists and Tuareg rebels.

Indeed, that series of attacks was a profound shock. It marked the most significant offensive since 2012, when Tuareg rebels and jihadists briefly seized control of the northern territories before French forces intervened a year later. This was a direct assault on the state. While the government has managed to retain power, losing parts of the north, it doesn’t appear the rebels are making further advances currently. Nevertheless, it represents a significant blow to the government’s prestige. It was a dramatic event that caught everyone by surprise, especially the Russians, who were brought in specifically to enhance security.

Interestingly, these Russian mercenaries reportedly withdrew without engaging in significant combat. Mali’s allies in the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), Niger and Burkina Faso, issued statements but provided no military support. Mali found itself relatively isolated. How do you explain this?

Laessing noted that the Russian presence has always been more about appearance than substance. With approximately 1,500 to 2,000 mercenaries on the ground, they represent only a third of the force France deployed, which itself struggled to pacify the entire country. The Russians’ brutal tactics have, in fact, exacerbated the conflict. Ultimately, their withdrawal from Kidal and two other northern locations without a fight was a humiliation. Similarly, there was little tangible support from Niger and Burkina Faso. While they claimed to offer air support, Mali was essentially left to fend for itself that day. This wasn’t surprising, as both Niger and Burkina Faso are grappling with their own severe jihadist threats. I don’t believe they possess the capacity to assist Mali, even if they had the desire.

Is the solidarity often proclaimed by the three AES states less robust than it appears?

Politically, these nations are closely aligned and share many aspirations. However, they lack the political will and, critically, the capabilities to realize these ambitions. While the three military leaders are united by a shared ideology, they also preside over three of the world’s poorest countries. One must be realistic about the potential of such cooperation. This isn’t akin to the EU building infrastructure together or NATO providing mutual defense; these are three extremely impoverished nations fighting for their very survival.

What potential solutions could emerge for Mali?

On a positive note, the Malian people generally do not desire Sharia law or Islamist rule. This sentiment could have sparked protests, even amidst dangers and repression, but it hasn’t. This indicates a clear rejection of such alternatives by the populace.

My hope is that this underlying sentiment can be leveraged, leading to genuine negotiations with the more moderate factions among the jihadists, thereby initiating a much-needed dialogue.

But what could be negotiated? Jihadists aim to control the country and impose Sharia law. How can one negotiate with such groups?

I don’t believe JNIM possesses the capacity to control a major city like Bamako or indeed the entire country. Their objective is more likely to be left undisturbed, to control specific regions, and to reach agreements with others. In Bamako, they might seek a government willing to implement a degree of Sharia and engage in negotiations with them.

Unlike some situations in the Middle East, these jihadists are not foreign invaders seeking to inflict violence for pleasure. They are local individuals. Their grievances often stem from issues like access to water and land, which the jihadists exploit. At some point, I believe discussions will become unavoidable. Military action is necessary, but so is dialogue with moderate elements. There are already nascent pressures for such dialogue emerging in various parts of Mali.

Mauritania faced a similar challenge. Their response involved both military force and strategic compromises, such as banning alcohol and adopting the designation of an Islamic Republic. It demonstrates that a full Taliban-style program isn’t always necessary. Perhaps common ground can be found to satisfy the country’s needs. Once instability is reduced, the state will naturally have greater capacity to act.

And what do the people of Mali truly desire?

The populace does not want Sharia law imposed in Bamako. This was evident during the late April attacks: there were no widespread protests or strong calls for the government’s resignation. People understand that if the current government falls, the next one is likely to be even more Islamist, which is not what they desire.

Despite all the criticisms leveled against the military government, it must be acknowledged that many people still support it. They reject the alternatives: they don’t want jihadist rule, nor do they want a return to the old, corrupt elites who were perceived as tied to France and Europe. Therefore, I believe that if no further major attacks occur, the government will likely remain in power, given the significant public support it retains.

So, you don’t feel that the impression conveyed by social media is misleading, and that a large segment of the population, particularly young people, genuinely supports Assimi Goïta’s government?

The average age in Mali is just 15 years old. Many young people are not even attending school. They have no ties to Europe or France and primarily get their information from social media, which often contains significant propaganda, including Russian-backed disinformation designed to bolster the government. I do believe there is still genuine support for the government. Following the late April attacks, it would have been an opportune moment for protests, as the regime was weakened. The same was true last autumn when fuel deliveries were disrupted. Yet, no one protested, clearly indicating that people do not want to be governed by JNIM.

Perhaps they are simply too preoccupied with their day-to-day survival, a situation made even more severe by the current blockade on Bamako?

Life has certainly become significantly harder, even prior to these recent attacks. People have grown resigned and have lost all faith in politicians. It must also be said that traditional political parties and older politicians have lost much credibility, having been in power before without bringing about real improvements. This is why many now think: let’s give those currently in power another chance.