The Central African Republic (CAR) has endured persistent instability since at least 2004, marked by a three-year civil war followed by prolonged insurgent conflicts. In an effort to restore order and stability, the CAR government extended an invitation to Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group in early 2018, initially for training purposes.

By 2019, the Wagner Group had established a significant presence, deploying over 1,000 mercenaries who became deeply embedded within the nation’s political, economic, and social frameworks. Their operations quickly focused on the lucrative extraction of gold, diamonds, and timber. This strategic penetration ultimately fostered the emergence of a conflict economy, where both these mercenaries and other armed factions capitalized on the country’s ongoing turmoil.

“Wagner not only forcefully and intimidatingly infiltrated local markets but also secured a strong foothold within President Faustin-Archange Touadéra’s administration, notably by installing a Russian national as a senior security advisor,” noted Christopher Faulkner and Raphael Parens in an analysis for the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs.

In 2021, a joint military offensive by Wagner and Central African governmental forces was launched across the country. While ostensibly a stabilization campaign, a June 2026 report by the GI-TOC (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime) revealed that it “transitioned from counter-insurgency to a broader process of territorial, political, and economic consolidation.”

Presently, the combined forces of the government and Wagner have fundamentally reshaped the economy. What once sustained various rebel groups now serves as a network reinforcing President Touadéra’s government and enriching Russia.

“Local elites, in collaboration with their foreign security partners, assimilated armed groups, and economic actors, have employed coercion and organized crime to solidify their power, control resources, and advance their financial interests, thereby transforming the CAR into a platform for powerful transnational criminal networks,” stated the GI-TOC report, titled “Criminal Markets: Mapping the Violent Criminal Ecosystem in the Central African Republic,” authored by Nathalia Dukhan and Ruben de Koning. Other nations exerting influence in the Central African Republic include the United Arab Emirates, Rwanda, and Turkey.

The involvement of Russian mercenaries in the CAR is unequivocally transactional. Their expanding presence is designed to integrate security, economic, and political control over natural resources, with the ultimate goal of “perpetuating Russia’s long-term influence,” as detailed in the comprehensive 72-page report.

The report’s authors further elaborated: “With Russian backing, Touadéra has solidified his political authority, and Wagner-linked individuals and allies have become integrated into key ministries, security agencies, customs administration, and the strategic resources sector. Rather than delivering stability, Bangui and Moscow have deepened and systematized patterns of coercion, extraction, and predation.”

Gains made by the government against armed groups have not eliminated the “rapacity of conflict” within the mining sectors, trade routes, and taxation, but have rather reallocated it to “government-linked actors and networks and individuals within the government, who profit from these various sectors,” Ruben de Koning told Africa Report magazine.

Specifically, Russia has significantly profited from the gold and fuel trade in the Central African Republic. The GI-TOC highlighted that Wagner established an “illicit fuel supply chain” to finance its joint military operations with the government and its extensive mining activities.

Ruben de Koning expressed to Africa Report his astonishment at the sheer scale of Wagner’s involvement in the CAR’s gold trade: “What particularly shocked me was the blatant mass and volume of gold that has been mined in the country.” He added that Wagner-controlled interests are estimated to produce approximately 5 tons of gold annually.

“This gold holds an export value of around $250 million, but its value on the international market could easily reach $500 million.”

The GI-TOC indicated that from 2021 onwards, Russian and Rwandan forces successfully reclaimed crucial mining regions across the country, preventing armed groups from controlling these territories. Consequently, a greater volume of artisanally mined gold was exported through official channels. By 2023, gold exports reached 1.7 tons. While exports were projected to total approximately 2.5 tons in 2025, they astonishingly reached 7 tons by the end of that year.

This figure “far exceeds the capacity of artisanal production, suggesting it must include industrially sourced gold, most likely originating from Wagner’s concessions,” Ruben de Koning clarified to Africa Report.

Although the security arrangement between Russia and the Central African Republic might be somewhat unique on the continent, Russia’s broader ambition to seize resources from African nations, particularly gold, is not. Russian forces have reportedly acquired over $2.5 billion worth of African gold between February 2022, marking Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the close of 2023, according to the Blood Gold Report.

Russia’s relentless pursuit of gold primarily targets the Central African Republic, Mali, and Sudan. In the CAR, Wagner has secured exclusive rights to the Ndassima mine, the largest in the country. In Sudan, Russia controls a major refinery and stands as the “primary purchaser of unprocessed Sudanese gold.” Meanwhile, in Mali, Russian mercenaries receive millions of dollars in cash monthly from the ruling junta, which heavily relies on gold mining companies for the majority of its tax revenue. This intricate network circumvents international sanctions through “complex smuggling routes and commercial concealment tactics” employed in the Central African Republic and Sudan, as outlined in the Report.