The definition of a coup d’état often shifts, influenced by the prevailing interests of the international community and endorsed by neighboring states. In Burkina Faso, the “appointment” of Transitional President Michel Kafando was deemed unconstitutional. For at least twelve months, the nation was set to operate under a framework of entirely newly established institutions.

Like a complex building set, the provisional governing bodies of the transition gradually took shape. Following the sudden appearance of military uniforms on the public stage, in the aftermath of President Blaise Compaoré’s hasty departure from Kosyam, Ouagadougou seemed to regain a measure of calm.

Emerging seemingly from nowhere, Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida quickly dominated the political landscape, assuming all the prerogatives of a Head of State. His true intentions were a subject of intense speculation. How did he manage to integrate himself among the protesters and political party leaders so seamlessly? Was his deployment to the Place de la Révolution, in an attempt to maintain control, a calculated decision made in concert between President Blaise Compaoré and General Gilbert Diendéré? Regardless, an officer from the Presidential Security Regiment (RSP) publicly aligning with the populace immediately sparked mistrust and significant suspicion. The military’s initial actions and directives, including the suspension of the Constitution and the dissolution of the National Assembly, fueled fears of an impending junta. It appeared the people, who had sacrificed and shed blood, might be deprived of their hard-won victory.

As is often its practice, the African Union promptly threatened to isolate Burkina Faso. Simultaneously, a delegation of ECOWAS heads of state – John Dramani Mahama of Ghana, Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, and Macky Sall of Sénégal – arrived in force to engage with the military leadership, urging them to reconsider their stance. The precedents set by Captains Daddis Camara in Guinea and Sanogo in Mali undoubtedly prompted Burkinabé officers to exercise caution: firstly, taking power by force is rarely met with impunity; secondly, an excessively prolonged crisis resolution process risked isolating the country and leading to escalating unpopularity.

Consequently, the military eventually negotiated a pragmatic compromise, formalized in the Charter of the Transition. The agreement stipulated that for the Executive, a civilian would lead the Transitional Presidency, while the military would maintain significant influence over the government. Concurrently, a 90-member legislative body – the National Transition Council (CNT) – was established to accommodate those who had spearheaded the struggle. A Designation Committee comprising about twenty members was entrusted with the crucial task of naming a Transitional President. This arrangement was a fixed-term contract, set to conclude in November 2015, coinciding with the end of President Blaise Compaoré’s original mandate.

For the selection of the Head of State, each segment of the nation’s key stakeholders – the army, civil society, opposition parties, religious, and traditional authorities – was required to submit a shortlist within a defined timeframe. Ultimately, five individuals were chosen:

• The opposition and civil society put forward two journalists: Newton Ahmed Barry, editor of the weekly L’Evènement, and Chériff Sy Moumina, publishing director of the weekly Bendré. Their legitimacy stemmed from their media outlets’ strong criticism of the former regime.
• The army adopted a broader approach, diversifying its candidate profiles: a clergyman, Archbishop Mgr Ouédraogo of Bobo Dioulasso; a diplomat, Michel Kafando; and a woman who was also a former minister, Joséphine Ouédraogo. Early on, the Archbishop of Bobo Dioulasso, an initial frontrunner, declared his lack of interest in the position, preferring to focus on his current ecclesiastical duties.

The remaining two candidates held a distinct advantage over the others: their extensive experience within major international institutions. Madame Joséphine Ouédraogo had previously served with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), while Michel Kafando had twice represented his country at the UN headquarters in New York, between 1981 and 1982, and again from 1998 to 2011. In the “Land of the Upright People,” an invisible divide separates society into two factions: those for Sankara and those against him. This subtle ideological rift has historically marked every political figure throughout their careers. Joséphine Ouédraogo served as Minister of Family Development and Solidarity from 1984 to 1987. Michel Kafando, conversely, was Minister of Foreign Affairs under Prime Minister Thomas Sankara’s government in 1982, during Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo’s presidency. The two men reportedly had disagreements on the conduct of Upper Volta’s diplomacy and were ideologically diametrically opposed.

A career in an international institution provides a dual benefit: an enhancement to one’s curriculum vitae and an invaluable network of contacts. This proved to be a disadvantage for the two aspiring journalists put forward by the opposition.

For a limited period, Michel Kafando, the retired diplomat, was compelled to set aside his cattle and chicken farming in Saponé for a higher purpose: safeguarding the nation in crisis! He assumed both the Presidency of the Transition and the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs. This dual role streamlined diplomatic channels, providing international partners with a single interlocutor and effectively sidestepping Prime Minister Isaac Zida.

The evolving situation in Burkina Faso was closely observed from numerous capitals: Accra, which chaired ECOWAS at the time; Addis Ababa, home of the African Union; and Paris and Washington, due to geopolitical considerations. On the day of Michel Kafando’s inauguration, several Heads of State – from Mauritania (representing the AU), Ghana (representing ECOWAS), Togo, Bénin, Mali, and Niger – traveled to Ouagadougou, signaling a move to reintegrate Burkina Faso. Did this significant representation implicitly endorse the reinstatement of a Constitution that had been suspended just weeks earlier? American policy generally dictates against cooperating with heads of state not chosen through universal suffrage, a situation currently applicable to Burkina Faso. The international community, therefore, found a way to legitimize the military takeover and establish a semblance of constitutional order. Consequently, American reconnaissance planes remained stationed in Ouagadougou, as Uncle Sam relies on Mauritania and Burkina Faso as crucial bases for monitoring the Sahel region.

Of the 26 ministerial positions, the military secured four critical portfolios: the Prime Minister also held the Ministry of Defense; Colonel Auguste Denise Barry, a former Security Minister in 2011, was appointed to Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Security (MATDS); Colonel David Kabré, spokesperson for Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida, took charge of Sports; and Boubacar Ba assumed responsibilities at the highly strategic Ministry of Mines and Energy. Joséphine Ouédraogo was assigned the position of Keeper of the Seals – perhaps as a consolation – while Augustin Loada, a university professor and prominent civil society figure, was named to the Public Service. Adama Sagnon, who inherited the Ministry of Culture, resigned a few days after his appointment, facing pressure from civil society groups who criticized the former prosecutor for having previously closed the Norbert Zongo case.

The National Transition Council (CNT), the interim legislative body, elected one of the unsuccessful candidates for the transitional presidency, Chériff Sy Moumina, as its president. He was chosen by his peers with 71 votes out of 90. The next crucial steps involved completing the institutional framework and mechanisms necessary to guide Burkina Faso towards transparent and equitable elections, including establishing the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), drafting a new electoral code, and enacting organic laws.

What were the key objectives for this brief transitional period?

Since early December, Michel Kafando had signed the presidential decree establishing the Commission for National Reconciliation and Reforms (CRNR). The scope and duration of this body’s mandate were central questions. More than 27 years after Thomas Sankara’s assassination, the “Land of the Upright People” aimed to finally embark on a process of catharsis. Shortly after his designation, one of President Michel Kafando’s initial decisions was to authorize investigations to identify Thomas Sankara’s remains. Prime Minister Isaac Zida also played a role, announcing that the file on President Thomas Sankara’s assassination would be “fully opened” and that, if necessary, Burkina Faso would seek Blaise Compaoré’s extradition from Morocco.

Through a series of public announcements, the current leaders effectively opened Pandora’s Box. Such sensitive cases typically demand an extended timeline that would likely exceed the transitional period. Were these declarations intended to reassure opponents of the Blaise Compaoré regime? As Minister of Defense, army reform should have been Isaac Zida’s priority. In this context, General Gilbert Diendéré – Blaise Compaoré’s special chief of staff and thus Isaac Zida’s direct hierarchical superior – was relieved of his duties by President Michel Kafando. He was replaced by Commander Théophile Nikièma, a former head of the RSP’s “Operations and Instruction” Bureau and also director of External Documentation, essentially the intelligence service of the Kosyam palace.

The question of Lieutenant-Colonel Isaac Zida’s and Commander Théophile Nikièma’s loyalty to General Gilbert Diendéré lingered. Burkina Faso successfully de-escalated the political crisis of October 30, which led to Blaise Compaoré’s downfall, with relatively few major incidents. The intervention of RSP elements during the initial clashes could have easily triggered a civil war. Would it not be more prudent to concentrate on holding elections rather than implicating General Gilbert Diendéré and other still-living civilian and military figures by reopening the Sankara case?

How could a “witch hunt” be avoided? Two general managers of major national companies, considered close to the ousted president’s family, were already dismissed: Jean-Baptiste Bérehoundougou from the Société Nationale Burkinabè des Hydrocarbures (SONABHY) and Jean Christophe Ilboudo from the Société Nationale Burkinabè d’Electricité (SONABEL). While an act of contrition does not fully absolve past transgressions, it contributes to reconciliation; this was the recent approach of Gilbert Noël Ouédraogo of the Alliance for Democracy and Federation – African Democratic Rally (ADF-RDA), a political party affiliated with the former presidential movement. Similarly, a national tribute was paid to the seven individuals who fell victim to gunfire during the events of October 30 and 31. They now rest in the Gounghin cemetery.

Will the CRNR endure beyond the end of the transitional period? With all institutions now established, political figures and parties will undoubtedly take center stage. No prominent political figure wished to occupy a seat within either the Executive or the CNT, which effectively disqualifies them from running in universal suffrage elections. Presidential candidates are already poised for the race. The creation of the CNT also provided an opportunity for the CFOP, the opposition coalition, to dissolve itself. The electoral battle is certainly expected to commence in early 2015.