After three years of relentless fighting in Sudan, the conflict has now spilled across the border into Chad. Cross-border strikes, heightened military tensions, and deepening communal divisions are drawing N’Djamena into the Sudanese crisis.

Since April 2023, Sudan has been engulfed in a brutal war between the army led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. Despite Chad’s official stance of neutrality, its government has quietly backed the RSF. This alignment has sparked fierce debate. It forces N’Djamena into an uneasy position: supporting a faction that has targeted Zaghawa populations in Darfur— a community that plays a central role in Chad’s political structure. Arms shipments, allegedly funded by the United Arab Emirates, have reportedly passed through towns such as Amdjarass and Adré, a decision with risks that are now becoming evident.

Tiné: a flashpoint at the heart of the crisis

Twin towns named Tiné straddle the border between Sudan and Chad, sharing the same Zaghawa population. These settlements serve as a critical crossing point for civilians fleeing the horrors of war in northern Darfur, seeking refuge in Chad.

On February 21, 2026, the Rapid Support Forces seized control of the Sudanese side of Tiné, sparking immediate clashes with Toroboro fighters—pro-government militias from both Chad and Sudan—as well as unauthorised Chadian military units. Within days, the town was retaken, but the violence underscored how quickly the conflict could spill over. In response, Chadian authorities announced the closure of the border, a move that did little to halt the fighting and only confirmed the permanence of the crisis along this contested frontier.

Just days later, on March 21, a deadly drone strike hit Tiné in Chad, killing nearly two dozen civilians. While Chadian officials deny involvement, suspicion runs deep. Opposition leader Ousmane Dillo, currently exiled in Sudan, released an audio message widely circulated on private messaging platforms, directly accusing Mahamat Déby and calling for his removal. Dillo also warned of the growing danger facing the Zaghawa community. On the Sudanese side, Minni Arkou Minawi, governor of Darfur, escalated tensions further by declaring that “war with Chad has already begun,” signalling a dangerous regional escalation.

Chad on high alert as tensions escalate

Chadian authorities have responded with unyielding resolve. Government spokesperson Gassim Chérif Mahamat reaffirmed the country’s neutrality while vowing a “proportionate” response to any aggression. President Mahamat Déby ordered the military to go on maximum alert. On March 22, a high-level security summit was convened in Tiné, bringing together senior military officials to strengthen border defenses and prevent further destabilisation. “This is Tiné, Chad—not Tiné, Sudan. Let the Sudanese army, the Toroboros, and the RSF fight their battles in Sudan. They must not bring their war here to kill our people,” declared General Ali Ahmat Akhabach, Minister of Security.

In a controversial move, N’Djamena also barred civilians from crossing the border, blocking women and children fleeing the horrors of war in Sudan from reaching safety in refugee camps. While intended to curb potential unrest within the Zaghawa community, the decision has done little to improve security. Regional analyst Cameron Hudson cautioned: “Chad’s military escalation at the Sudanese border risks deepening its involvement in the conflict rather than preventing it. Déby’s attempt to project strength may backfire—this could be a critical strategic misstep.”

The war in Sudan fuels dangerous communal divisions in Chad

Yet the crisis extends beyond the Zaghawa. According to Chadian security sources, the RSF has been recruiting young men from the Tama community in recent weeks. This recruitment, resembling mercenary activity, is being facilitated through local networks involving traditional leaders, administrative authorities, and figures close to the government.

The Tama people, like the Zaghawa, are a transnational community, living on both sides of the Chad-Sudan border in regions such as Wadi Fira and Ouaddaï. Though not Arab, they were once integrated into the Janjaweed militias—the predecessors of the RSF—and engaged in violent clashes against groups including the Zaghawa during the early years of the Darfur conflict. This resurgence of old tensions is deeply concerning: it is reopening old wounds within Chadian society and fuelling a growing sense of insecurity across communities.

What was once a fragile strategic calculation has now become a dangerous spiral. Chad’s government finds itself trapped in a conflict it may no longer be able to control. The genie is out of the bottle—and it is not going back in.