The escalating struggle for control in Nigeria’s sambisa forest
The sprawling Sambisa Forest, covering 60,000 square kilometers across Northeast Nigeria, once thrived as a vibrant natural reserve, drawing tourists to its diverse wildlife. Today, however, much of that natural beauty has vanished, replaced by the relentless struggle of two militant factions and the soldiers who pursue them.
Since 2016, when Boko Haram fractured into two distinct entities, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad (JAS), the original Boko Haram group, and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), these rival organizations have been locked in a fierce contest for dominance over the forest. Recent intelligence indicates a significant escalation in these internal clashes.
Sambisa’s immense size and dense, protective canopy make it an exceptionally valuable strategic asset. It offers ideal cover for establishing hideouts, launching offensive operations, and controlling crucial trafficking corridors within the region.
According to Malik Samuel, a senior researcher at Good Governance Africa, the initial phase of the conflict for JAS was primarily a battle for survival. Despite their internal rivalry, both factions have demonstrated remarkable resilience, rebuilding their capabilities and maintaining their capacity to confront state forces, including the Nigerian military and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF).
A security analyst based in Borno, Zagazola Makama, has documented numerous engagements within and around the Sambisa Forest, citing local reports. Both warring parties frequently assert they have inflicted substantial casualties on their opponents.
While these claims often lack independent verification, they undeniably underscore the intense rivalry between the groups. This internal conflict has evolved into a parallel insurgency, existing alongside their broader campaign against government forces.
The insurgency initiated by Boko Haram in 2009 has had devastating regional consequences, extending its reach into neighboring Cameroon, Niger, and Chad. United Nations data reveals that this prolonged conflict has resulted in over 40,000 civilian fatalities and displaced more than 2 million people.
JAS is predominantly known for its brutal tactics, including kidnappings, widespread looting, and lethal attacks. In contrast, ISWAP has focused on consolidating territorial control, imposing taxes, and establishing an alternative local governance structure, despite its equally vicious disregard for human life. Historically, both the Sambisa Forest and the islands of Lake Chad have served as vital strategic strongholds for these two factions.
- Makama observes that despite concerted counter-terrorism efforts, recent information suggests these insurgent groups continue to maintain active communication networks and operational capabilities within these critical enclaves. The ongoing battles between Boko Haram (JAS) and ISWAP are increasingly viewed through a dual lens: as a challenge due to the unpredictable nature they introduce into the security landscape, and as an opportunity, potentially weakening the overall cohesion of insurgent forces across the region.
The Nigerian and multinational forces’ primary focus on countering ISWAP’s offensive against military installations inadvertently provided JAS with the necessary space and time to regroup, according to Taiwo Adebayo, a Boko Haram specialist at the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa.
In a recent analysis, Adebayo emphasized the need to re-evaluate security strategies, advocating for JAS to be treated as an independent and adaptable threat, rather than merely a weakened adversary of ISWAP.
Malik Samuel anticipates a prolonged stalemate in the conflict between these two rival militant groups.
He explains, “ISWAP faces significant challenges in penetrating JAS’s stronghold in Barwa, where its leadership is located. This logistical hurdle complicates any large-scale operation, similar to past Sambisa campaigns, aimed at eliminating the JAS command. Furthermore, the close proximity of both groups within the Lake Chad islands renders clashes unavoidable as they fiercely compete for territory and vital resources.”
“However, beyond the islands, JAS is generally outmatched by ISWAP. This is primarily due to ISWAP’s superior numerical strength, broader territorial reach, more extensive operational coverage, greater experience, and the presence of foreign terrorist fighters within its ranks.”