escalating economic warfare in west africa’s Sahel region

key statistics

From January 1 to November 28, 2025:

• Over 10,000 fatalities resulted from political violence in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.
• Militants abducted 30 foreign nationals in Mali (22) and Niger (8).
• Benin experienced a 70% surge in fatalities compared to the same period in 2024, according to ACLED records.

militant expansion and economic disruption

In 2025, jihadist militant factions intensified their campaigns in the central Sahel, threatening the stability of military-led governments in the region. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) solidified their presence across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, while extending operations into the Benin-Niger-Nigeria borderlands.

Economic warfare emerged as a deliberate strategy by militant groups to undermine state functions and pressure governments. In Mali, JNIM enforced a comprehensive fuel and transport blockade on Kayes and Nioro du Sahel, disrupting trade and transportation between Bamako and surrounding regions. This blockade triggered fuel shortages and price surges nationwide, crippling the economy and eroding public trust in the military regime. Violence in Kayes, Sikasso, and Segou escalated to record levels, marking the highest monthly casualties since ACLED began tracking data in 1997.

In Burkina Faso, JNIM maintained relentless offensives against both the military and the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP). The group briefly seized provincial capitals of Djibo and Diapaga in May, demonstrating a significant leap in military capability. In September, JNIM ambushed a military convoy near Koubel-Alpha in Soum province, killing approximately 90 soldiers in one of the deadliest attacks on national forces. These operations underscore JNIM’s growing strength and its intent to destabilize military regimes by undermining state authority, territorial control, and economic stability.

While Niger has not faced the same intensity of violence, it remains increasingly vulnerable to militant activities. Militant influence has spread beyond traditional conflict zones into southern Dosso and northern Agadez regions. Similar to JNIM, ISSP has intensified attacks on the Benin-Niger oil pipeline in the Dosso and Tahoua regions along the Nigerian border. The October abduction of a U.S. citizen in Niamey highlights the country’s growing fragility and the expanding reach of militants into urban centers once considered secure.

Both JNIM and ISSP launched targeted kidnapping campaigns against foreigners, contributing to record-high abduction rates in Mali and Niger. JNIM primarily targeted foreign workers to disrupt industrial production, mining operations, and transit routes. ISSP adopted a broader approach, abducting Western nationals and foreign laborers, with most incidents occurring in Niger. ACLED data also records additional cases in border areas of Burkina Faso and Algeria. These ISSP-sponsored operations signal a shift toward high-value hostage-taking, often outsourced to criminal networks.

a new conflict frontline emerges

A defining development for 2026 is the consolidation of a new militant frontline in the Benin-Niger-Nigeria borderlands, now critical for both Sahelian and Nigerian militant factions.

Throughout 2025, JNIM and ISSP entrenched their presence in this tri-border region, transforming it into a major conflict zone with implications for both the Sahel and coastal West Africa. Northern Benin experienced its deadliest year on record as JNIM intensified cross-border operations from eastern Burkina Faso in April, culminating in the deaths of over 50 soldiers in Park W. By mid-2025, the group had advanced further south into the Borgou department along the Nigerian border, marking a southward expansion beyond the northern regions of Atacora and Alibori. JNIM also claimed its first attack in Nigeria in late October.

Meanwhile, ISSP reinforced its position in southwestern Niger, moving closer to Gaya on the Benin border, and continued operations in Nigeria’s Sokoto and Kebbi states. In the Niger-Nigeria border areas, the group targeted villages, security outposts, and military patrols while sabotaging critical infrastructure. Both Sahelian factions have now established footholds in northwestern and western Nigeria.

The merging of Sahelian and Nigerian militant theaters represents a turning point. The previously distinct Sahelian and Nigerian conflicts are gradually converging into a single, interconnected conflict environment stretching from Mali to western Nigeria. This subregion is poised to become a major arena of militant competition in 2026, with groups like JNIM, ISSP, Ansaru, Mahmuda, Islamic State West Africa Province factions, and bandit groups increasingly overlapping in border areas. As their operational zones expand into shared spaces, new patterns of violence and evolving dynamics are likely to emerge across these frontiers.

regional instability and shifting power dynamics

As militant groups extend their influence, the military regimes of the central Sahel face mounting internal and external pressures. In Mali and Burkina Faso, JNIM’s sustained offensives, blockades, and sieges have weakened state control and exposed structural vulnerabilities. In Mali, the ongoing fuel and transport embargo continues to strain the economy, hinder the movement of goods and people, and intensify civilian hardship, eroding the junta’s legitimacy. Prolonged disruptions risk deepening divisions within the armed forces and sparking unrest that the regime may struggle to contain.

Burkina Faso faces comparable challenges. Years of sustained conflict have left the army and VDP overstretched. JNIM’s temporary capture of major towns not only highlights the group’s tactical evolution but also signals potential threats to regional capitals like Fada N’Gourma in the east. The state’s inability to defend provincial and departmental capitals raises concerns that continued military losses and territorial concessions could fuel internal dissent and coup pressures, mirroring the conditions that toppled previous governments.

State authority is steadily eroding across the central Sahel, despite junta promises to restore security. JNIM and ISSP now contest sovereignty over vast rural territories, where they impose their own social order, tax populations, and regulate access to livelihoods. Their influence is encroaching on major urban centers once considered insulated from militancy. ISSP’s incursions into Ayorou and Tillabéri, along with operations in Niamey, demonstrate that no area is immune to militant activity.

Local self-defense groups, pivotal to state counter-insurgency efforts, are under unprecedented strain. In Mali, many Dozo militias have been disarmed or forced into agreements with JNIM, leaving communities dependent on militant-enforced arrangements for limited security and economic access. In Burkina Faso, the VDP—once central to Traoré’s mobilization strategy—has suffered heavy losses and remains largely on the defensive, limiting the state’s ability to reclaim territory. As these groups weaken, militant groups are likely to expand their territorial control and authority.

Russia’s military partnership with Sahelian states has shown limited effectiveness. The transition from the Wagner Group to Africa Corps left large areas vulnerable, as the latter operates with a narrower mandate and has struggled to prevent militant advances. However, by year-end, Africa Corps shifted its focus to securing fuel convoys and critical supply routes in southern Mali, where JNIM’s embargo began losing momentum. This partnership is expected to remain vital in 2026, with Africa Corps providing essential logistical and aerial support to help the junta maintain control over major transit routes and urban centers despite ongoing security challenges.

The combination of sustained militant pressure, weakened local militias, and declining state capacity and legitimacy heightens the risk of political destabilization in the central Sahel. If either the Malian or Burkinabe military regimes succumb to internal divisions or public unrest, a regional domino effect could unfold, placing neighboring governments in increasingly precarious positions. If current trends persist, 2026 may witness deeper political instability and territorial fragmentation across the central Sahel and its southern borders.