Can the AES’s security model survive the jihadist storm after Dioura?
In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, the promise of reclaiming territory from armed jihadist groups is colliding with a reality that is becoming harder to conceal. A steady stream of attacks and the setbacks suffered by national forces and their Russian partners are raising uncomfortable questions about the effectiveness of the security strategy pursued by the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). In Mali, the assault on Dioura, followed by fresh operations against military positions, illustrates a threat that the presence of Africa Corps has not been able to contain.
What happened at Dioura and why the toll keeps rising
On 10 September, the military camp at Dioura, in central Mali, was the target of a major offensive claimed by the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), an Al-Qaeda affiliate. The death toll has grown heavier by the day. Military, security and local sources put the number of dead Malian soldiers at no fewer than 100, with five members of the Russian Africa Corps also killed. Malian authorities have not released a definitive figure. JNIM claims an even higher toll, with 150 dead and 93 prisoners — numbers that cannot be independently verified.
The scale of the losses is not the only worrying element. Images released by the jihadist group suggest that a large quantity of weapons, ammunition and vehicles was seized at Dioura. The Malian army site appears to have been turned into a supply source for JNIM fighters. The ability to temporarily overrun a military position and strip it of its equipment is a telling indicator of the difficulties Malian forces face on the ground.
Pressure creeping closer to Bamako
Dioura is not an isolated episode. In the days that followed, JNIM stepped up operations against military installations in central Mali. Attacks targeted Konna and the Sévaré area, home to important Malian military infrastructure and elements of the Africa Corps.
In Sévaré, kamikaze drones struck the zone where Russian helicopters and Turkish Bayraktar armed drones are stationed. The attack was particularly symbolic: it hit infrastructure meant to underpin the technological superiority of Malian forces and their Russian partners.
The threat is also reaching the outskirts of the capital. After several offensives against Malian positions in 2026, JNIM continues to demonstrate its ability to hit strategic routes and infrastructure near Bamako. This shift matters: the challenge is no longer only defending remote rural areas but also protecting the country’s main political, military and economic centres.
Africa Corps: a new name, contested results
Since the withdrawal of French forces and the UN mission, Bamako has chosen to deepen its military partnership with Moscow. Africa Corps, placed under the direct control of the Russian Ministry of Defence, has gradually taken over from Wagner in Mali. Its troop numbers are estimated by some sources at several thousand men.
The cooperation was supposed to strengthen the Malian authorities’ military capabilities, restore control over territory and fight jihadist groups and armed movements more effectively.
But recent events raise a central question: is the Russian presence actually improving the security situation?
The setbacks of 2026 provide at least grounds for debate. In April, a coordinated offensive by JNIM and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) struck several Malian towns and military positions. In July, an ambush near Anéfis inflicted further losses on Malian forces and their Russian partners. Analysts have since pointed to the limits of Africa Corps against a jihadist strategy built on mobility, attrition and coordinated attacks.
The Dioura attack therefore reinforces a question that goes beyond Mali: can a foreign force, even one equipped with air power and drones, compensate for the structural weaknesses of a national army facing an insurgency rooted in the territories?
A crisis that spills across Mali’s borders
The problem concerns the entire AES. Burkina Faso and Niger are also facing persistent activity by armed jihadist groups. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, violence linked to militant Islamist groups has reached particularly high levels in the Sahel, with thousands of deaths recorded in recent years. JNIM alone accounts for a major share of deaths linked to militant violence in the region.
The Institute for Security Studies also estimates that the evolving tactics and alliances of armed groups pose a growing challenge for Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. It calls for more concrete regional cooperation between the three countries.
The AES, created precisely with the ambition of strengthening defence and security cooperation among its members, thus finds itself facing a contradiction. While its leaders present their alliance as a sovereign response to the region’s security difficulties, jihadist groups continue to demonstrate their ability to exploit gaps in military arrangements.
Measuring effectiveness beyond firepower
Questioning the effectiveness of Africa Corps does not mean Russian forces are incapable of conducting operations. They have aircraft, helicopters, drones and intelligence capabilities that can inflict losses on armed groups. But the multiplication of attacks against Malian forces shows that these means alone are not enough to reverse the dynamics of the conflict.
More worrying still, some operations attributed to Africa Corps have sparked serious accusations regarding civilian populations. Human Rights Watch says airstrikes carried out in June in Kyrnia, in the Mopti region, killed eight civilians, including three children. The organisation also accuses Africa Corps fighters of killing nine civilians in Bombori in July. These accusations are contested in their interpretation and must be placed in the context of operations against armed groups, but they fuel criticism of the methods used.
Yet in an asymmetric war, firepower is only one part of the response. Protecting populations, local intelligence, lasting control of territory, securing roads and the ability to prevent armed groups from regenerating are just as decisive.
The AES’s security gamble put to the test
Dioura is therefore more than a tactical defeat. The attack comes after months of jihadist offensives and at a time when Bamako is heavily betting on its partnership with Moscow.
For AES governments, the challenge now is to prove that their security model can deliver lasting results. Yet the succession of attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger shows that the jihadist threat remains deeply entrenched.
The presence of Africa Corps has changed the AES’s military setup, but it has not removed the threat. In Mali, the attacks on Dioura, Sévaré and areas near Bamako brutally remind of this reality.
The true measure of the AES’s security strategy will not be the number of weapons delivered, strikes carried out or fighters announced as neutralised. It will be measured by the ability of states to durably protect their soldiers and populations, secure their territories and prevent armed groups from seizing the initiative. On that front, recent events show the challenge remains entirely unresolved.