The rebels of the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) established a strategic corridor linking Libya to northern Mali through Niger to orchestrate their recent military campaign.

In the ever-shifting security landscape of the Sahel, southern Libya once again stands as the pulsating heart of rebellion dynamics. Touareg rebels of the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) exploited Libyan territory as a crucial logistics base to prepare and launch the large-scale offensive on 25 April aimed at recapturing Kidal.

Fezzan and Oubari: logistics sanctuaries
At the center of this setup is the Fezzan region, a historically porous area in southern Libya. Rebel infrastructure is believed to have been organized near the town of Oubari. Far from being a mere passive refuge, this area served as a launch point, logistics command center, and supply hub for FLA fighters. From this sanctuary, the movement planned the military operations currently shaking northern Mali.

The ‘Salvador Pass’: artery of all trafficking
To project their forces and equipment toward the Malian theater, the rebels rely on a highly strategic cross-border axis. This corridor traces a continuous line linking southern Libya to northern Mali, crossing Niger from side to side. The central element of this route is the renowned ‘Salvador Pass’. Located in extreme northern Niger, this desert crossroads is known as a preferred transit zone for terrorist groups as well as arms and drug trafficking networks. In the context of this offensive, the pass facilitates the flow of three vital elements:

• Military materiel (weapons, ammunition, logistics);
• Fuel, a precious commodity for the mobility of pickup columns in the desert;
• Fighter movements, using this vector to go to the front before withdrawing to Libyan territory after combat.

[South Libya: Oubari / Fezzan]
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[North Niger: Salvador Pass] *(Zone under control of local armed groups)*
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[North Mali: Kidal / Azawad]

Niger: mandatory passage under conditions
The use of this corridor highlights the complexity of cross-border alliances. As the Nigerien portion of this axis is under the control of various local armed groups, the FLA could not act unilaterally. To move its troops and supply convoys, the Touareg rebellion had to negotiate passage rights and obtain authorization from these actors who control northern Niger. This logistical compromise demonstrates that the success of offensives in the Sahel now depends on pragmatic agreements between interconnected armed factions at the regional level.

As the battle for control of northern Mali intensifies, these elements confirm the deeply regional dimension of the conflict, where Libyan instability continues to project its effects on Sahelian flashpoints.