Amidst escalating tensions, Mali faces profound instability, while its regional partners appear hesitant to intervene effectively. Neither the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) – intended to forge a collective security response among Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger – nor ECOWAS, from which Bamako has withdrawn, seem capable of exerting significant influence. West Africa currently projects an image of strategic paralysis, characterized by silence, perfunctory condemnations, and intricate political calculations. Bakary Sambe, president of the Timbuktu Institute and a research professor at Gaston-Berger University in Saint-Louis, offers insights into this period, which is fundamentally reshaping West Africa’s security landscape.

Regarding the April 25 attacks, what is the current understanding of the situation in Mali?

Bakary Sambe: The coordinated assault was devastating, particularly in Kati, where the Defense Minister, Sadio Camara, tragically lost his life, subsequently replaced by General Assimi Goïta himself. However, at this juncture, it’s crucial to refrain from speculating about a potential regime change or the collapse of Bamako. Life, despite the challenges, continues, and Malians, long accustomed to crises, once again demonstrate their remarkable resilience. This persists amidst the ongoing exchange of communiqués between the military authorities, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), and JNIM.

What concrete actions are Burkina Faso and Niger, Mali’s allies in the AES, taking?

Captain Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso officially condemned the events as a “monstrous conspiracy.” While some might perceive this response as muted, Ouagadougou’s stance is primarily pragmatic. Burkina Faso remains deeply preoccupied with its own internal security challenges, which accounts for its relatively limited external engagement. Just last week, several attacks claimed the lives of numerous soldiers on Burkinabè soil. For instance, during the fuel blockade in Mali in late 2025, Burkina Faso initially provided logistical aid until its own domestic situation became too precarious to manage further commitments.

Legally, Articles 5 and 6 of the Liptako-Gourma Charter, which forms the foundation of this Sahelian alliance, are often likened to NATO’s principle of mutual assistance. This framework is quite explicit. However, for both Burkina Faso and Niger, the severe internal security threats restrict their capacity for implementation. On paper, the AES functions as a confederation that has yet to achieve strategic maturity, particularly regarding its ability to pool resources. This week, Nigerien authorities reluctantly declared a national day of “fasting” and prayers in response to terrorism.

The Malian crisis highlights the ineffectiveness of regional alliances.

ECOWAS has called for “regional mobilization,” but what is its objective, especially since Bamako withdrew from the organization in January 2025?

This declaration must be understood within the recent regional context. It follows a significant meeting dedicated to the Sahel, held in Lomé, Togo. For the first time in years, ministers from AES nations, alongside representatives from ECOWAS, the African Union, France, the European Union, and Russia, convened at the same table.

Beyond the immediate crisis in Mali, it’s vital to recognize ongoing diplomatic efforts aiming to counteract regional fragmentation and the worsening security situation of recent years. In this context, ECOWAS seeks to redefine its image, moving away from being perceived as a regional body that attempted military intervention in Niger.

During the Lomé meeting, Mali’s Foreign Minister, Abdoulaye Diop, affirmed that channels for dialogue and exchange remain open, strictly within the framework of respecting the sovereignty of Sahelian states. Through these overtures, ECOWAS intends to gradually re-engage in the Sahelian political landscape.

The African Union, meanwhile, emphasizes the importance of “continental mechanisms” to prevent increased security destabilization in the Central Sahel. What exactly is the continental organization referring to?

Again, the formation of the AES, underpinned by the Liptako-Gourma Charter, has somewhat disrupted the existing regional security framework. This is despite the fact that this framework had never been particularly effective in counter-terrorism efforts. The reason is straightforward: for over a decade, regional organizations were largely sidelined from security matters, with a clear prioritization given to the G5 Sahel, which was dissolved in 2023.

Despite their historical detachment from Sahelian security, both the African Union and ECOWAS continue to pursue the ideal of an intervention force, or at least a joint force. However, this aspiration struggles to materialize on the ground. By the end of 2026, ECOWAS plans to deploy a 1,650-strong anti-terrorism brigade, but a broader armed or peacekeeping mission remains highly uncertain for now.

Regardless, there’s a growing awareness that isolating the Central Sahel from West Africa in the hope of combating armed groups constitutes a strategic misstep. When faced with divisive issues, security must be managed collaboratively through intelligence sharing and the pooling of resources. The shock of April 25 has brought the indispensable need for security cooperation, even minimal, back to the forefront.

Russia is experiencing a strategic defeat.

Indeed, another actor that has increased its visits to the Sahel in recent months is Washington. What stance might the United States adopt regarding the Malian crisis?

Beyond Donald Trump’s relative disinterest in Africa, we are witnessing a renewed focus from American diplomacy, with high-ranking officials returning to the Sahel, even to Niger, where US military personnel had been expelled. This is simply because the stakes have shifted.

Furthermore, the situation in Mali highlights a complete strategic failure for Russia, epitomized by the death of Defense Minister Sadio Camara. He was widely regarded as the most pro-Russian military figure to reach the pinnacle of the Malian state. The withdrawal of Africa Corps paramilitaries from Kidal serves as another powerful indicator.

Russia’s setback in the Sahel is not merely military; it is profoundly symbolic. A myth has crumbled: that of Russia’s capacity to guarantee the protection and security of regimes. Moscow’s diplomatic and security leverage risks suffering a significant blow.

Conversely, if the United States believes it can challenge, or even displace, the Russians from the Sahel, Washington will likely find compelling geostrategic and diplomatic reasons to establish a more pronounced presence in the region, particularly in Mali, with the underlying issue of resources always in view.

Does the Malian crisis now threaten the Gulf of Guinea nations?

For coastal states, the dynamics within Burkina Faso are the primary source of concern for the central governments of Togo, Benin, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire. Currently, if Mali’s security situation were to deteriorate further, the repercussions would be more acutely felt in Senegal or Mauritania. Consequently, all eyes are on Ouagadougou. The fear of a Sahelian domino effect is highly relevant, as is the questioning of the AES’s future and institutional viability. Populations are seeking tangible solutions beyond mere rhetoric.

In the interim, Togo is endeavoring to forge a new “bridge with the Sahel,” to quote the Togolese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Robert Dussey. The long-term implications of this initiative remain to be seen.

The Sahel cannot be separated from West Africa.

Should we fear a domino effect after these attacks, particularly in Burkina Faso?

The Malian case is unique; to assume such an attack would replicate elsewhere might be premature. Notably, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) does not operate in Burkina Faso. In Mali, the catalyst was a confluence of deep security crises in the North and political instability in Bamako.

Paradoxically, the severity of these attacks could inadvertently provide a form of political capital for the ruling authorities. This is because whenever the issue of the North becomes critical or highly visible, it tends to galvanize the Malian population around its army, fueled by a sense of territorial integrity. The rallying around the flag in Bamako has been exceptionally strong in recent days, effectively dampening any dissenting voices, which, in the current climate, would be perceived as contrary to the prevailing patriotism. The authorities no longer even require fervent communication strategies.

Returning to the domino effect, despite vast territories outside Ouagadougou’s central control, there is, for the moment, no influential protest movement significant enough to bolster JNIM jihadists and destabilize Burkina Faso on such a broad scale.