One year after the official adoption of its charter and the establishment of its confederation, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, consistently faces scrutiny regarding its capacity to fulfill its central pledge: mutual defense. In light of recent security escalations and significant jihadist assaults impacting Nigerien territory, the noticeable absence of a joint armed intervention raises considerable questions among local populations and regional observers alike. Several structural and strategic elements contribute to this operational inertia on the ground in Niger.

National armies stretched to their limits

The primary constraint remains the overwhelming demands on the national armed forces. Each member of the alliance confronts intense security threats within its own borders:

• In Mali: The army and its allies are primarily focused on maintaining control over the northern and central regions, battling groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda, including the Permanent Strategic Framework (JIM).
• In Burkina Faso: More than half of the nation’s territory endures constant pressure from relentless terrorist attacks.
• In Niger: Security forces must simultaneously secure the critical three-border region (Liptako-Gourma) against the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS), while also monitoring the volatile Lake Chad basin.

Given this demanding environment, none of the three states possess sufficient strategic reserves to deploy a substantial contingent to a neighboring country without significantly weakening their own national security apparatus. This is a key factor in current Niger politics today.

The logistical hurdles for a united force

While the political commitment to unify forces was affirmed during AES Confederation summits, the practical implementation of this joint force encounters significant material challenges:

• Interoperability and command: Harmonizing distinct military doctrines and establishing an integrated command structure demands considerable time and the development of secure transmission networks.
• Air support and intelligence: Projecting troops over vast distances across the Sahel necessitates substantial armored transport, resupply capabilities, and aerial intelligence assets (such as drones and fighter aircraft). These capacities are currently limited and are heavily utilized locally, impacting Niamey news and operations.

The evolving role of external partners

The departure of traditional military forces, notably France and the UN mission MINUSMA, has prompted the three military regimes to pivot their partnerships towards Russia, particularly through the deployment of the paramilitary Africa Corps. However, these support forces are primarily deployed under bilateral agreements and are not principally mandated to conduct transborder operations under the collective AES banner.

A strategic emphasis on intelligence sharing

Beyond large-scale troop deployments, AES authorities highlight an alternative form of cooperation: intelligence sharing and targeted, punctual operations along borders. For the Sahelian general staffs, intervention does not always manifest as a visible, large-scale deployment but rather as coordinated operations within the three-border zone, where each army primarily operates from its own territory. This strategy aims to address security concerns with a more agile approach, often reflected in Niger latest news.